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Abstract 
This article explores why local police officers choose to comply or to resist the police reforms stipulated 
by an international peacebuilding mission operating in their country. In order to understand the role and 
impact of local agency and shine light on local actors’ compliance decisions, this article analyses two 
examples of police reform of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. This paper makes three 
contributions to the peacebuilding and compliance literatures. First, it formulates and tests causal 
mechanisms showing exactly how local actors’ motivations for compliance – legitimacy, coercion, and 
reward-seeking- are causally linked to compliance. Second, it demonstrates that while legitimacy 
matters to local compliance choices, it does so only in specific contexts and situations. Finally, it shows 
that despite the claims about international peacebuilding operations’ coercive and incentivising powers, 
local actors only consider the rewards and coercive potential of their local police forces relevant to their 
compliance decisions. 
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Introduction 
Despite two decades of international peacebuilding experience, the record of its effectiveness 
and success in rebuilding peace after conflict remains ‘mixed at best’.i Increasingly, potential 
explanations for this mixed tracked record do not only evaluate shortcomings within the 
international operations themselvesii, but also include the influence local actors have on the 
peacebuilding process and its outcomes. As part of the ‘local turn in peacebuilding’iii more 
attention is paid to the power and agency of local actors to either support and comply with the 
reforms, or to evade or resist them.iv Studies from anthropology and sociology assist in 
shining light on the perceptions of local actors in peacebuilding and refute the image of the 
local actors as passive recipients of international peacebuilding reforms.v  
 Such studies also show that while local capacities are crucial for peacebuilding 
efforts,vi we cannot assume unity within this category, but that different local groups may 
well pursue diverging or even competing interests in the context of peacebuilding.vii 
Similarly, de Waal highlights that local strategies for achieving peace often have little in 
common with Western ideas of inclusive, liberal peacebuilding but can take the form of 
violent bargaining in a ‘political market-place’.viii The roles and influence local actors have 
on peacebuilding efforts are complex and varied and require situational analysis. 
So, despite the increasing focus on local power in influencing peacebuilding processes 
and outcomes, we still know very little of what drives local behavioural choices. Why do 
some local actors choose to comply with peacebuilding reforms and why do others evade or 
even resist the same efforts? Naturally, local behavioural choices in peacebuilding encompass 
a wide spectrum and cannot be limited to a binary distinction between compliance and 
resistance.ix The question of local compliance with international peacebuilding reforms is one 
crucial aspect that shapes the effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts. While 
outcomes are determined by many elements (local and international) that are beyond the 
scope of this paper, local compliance with the reforms is a necessary, though not sufficient 
condition for achieving sustainable peacebuilding outcomes. That is because most 
peacebuilding efforts, while usually initiated and driven by internationals, are implemented 
directly by or with the substantial assistance of relevant local actors.x Only when 
internationally stipulated reforms are bought into by relevant local actors, do they have a 
chance of outliving the deployment of the operation.xi 
In a bid to better understand why local actors would choose to comply or not to 
comply with an international peacebuilding operation’s reforms, this paper links the insights 
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of the literature on compliance to the debates of peacebuilding effectiveness. Compliance in 
the literatures of International Relations and Political Science is traditionally analysed in a 
tripartite power framework. Compliance is seen as the result of one of three power pathways: 
coercion, reward-seeking, or legitimacy.xii The same three pathways are subject to discussion 
in the small part of the peacebuilding literature concerned with local compliance with 
peacebuilding reforms.xiii  
In what is an exploratory study, this paper adopts this tripartite power framework to 
investigate why local actors working on an international operation’s reforms choose to 
comply or not to comply. The aim of this paper is not to produce generalizable findings but to 
propose a framework of analysis that links the three power pathways, coercion, reward-
seeking, and legitimacy, to individual actors’ compliance. This framework can be adapted by 
other researcher for their analyses. In this article, it helps provide insights into first, the 
comparative relevance of each pathway for local compliance; and second, it shines light on 
the mechanisms linking each pathway to compliance. The first contributes to the debates 
prevalent in International Relations and Political Science that are also mirrored in the 
peacebuilding literature, about whether rational-choice mechanisms (coercion and reward-
seeking) or the normative mechanism of legitimacy are more important in achieving 
compliance.xiv The second contributes to the compliance and legitimacy literatures’ debates 
which assume, but do not specify or test, a causal link between each of the power pathways 
and compliance.xv   
The analysis is based on two cases of police reform as stipulated by the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). EULEX presents an interesting case for 
studying local compliance choices, as it employs an explicitly cooperative approach to reform 
that relies on local actors to implement reforms.xvi Police reform as part of strengthening the 
rule of law has become a central element of international peacebuilding efforts, but it is an 
area where local traditions and norms are likely to persist.xvii This makes the transfer of 
knowledge and building up of capacity much more than a simple technical exercise, and 
highlights the importance of local reception of these reforms.xviii The choice for a single-case 
study was made to provide maximum room for detailed analysis of the power pathways and 
the compliance framework, although this limits the generalizability of the findings of the 
study. 
The findings, while bounded, contribute important insights into local compliance with 
peacebuilding reforms. First, all three pathways of power are shown to matter to local 
compliance choices but they do so to varying degrees. The variable that determines their 
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relevance is the rank and position of the local police officers. For instance legitimacy only 
plays a secondary role to lower rank officers, but increases in significance for the senior ranks 
of the police. Whether legitimacy matters is therefore highly context-specific and these 
findings add nuance and detail to the debate about legitimacy’s importance to compliance. 
Second, coercion, reward-seeking and legitimacy only affect compliance if the specified 
intervening variable of each mechanism is present. So, reward-seeking can be important for 
an officer, but unless he has access to an incentive structure, compliance behaviour remains 
unaffected.  
 
International Police Reform in Kosovo 
 
International peacebuilding is an umbrella term which comprises many elements and aims at 
rebuilding state institutions and social bonds after internal war or conflict to ensure lasting 
peace. This can include the formal institutions of the state like the rule of law and 
administration, and less formal institutions which aim at building a positive peace for 
society.xix Re-establishing or strengthening the local rule of law is crucial in a post-conflict 
state as it ensures that past violations or war crimes can be addressed, and that any future 
grievances can be dealt with in an institutionalised, professional, and impartial manner rather 
than sparking renewed fighting. A functioning rule of law not only aims at pacifying relations 
between citizens but also at rebuilding trust in the state and its capacity and interest to serve 
all citizens equally and fairly. 
One element of the rule of law is police reform. A professional and impartial police is 
key to post-conflict peacebuilding as it represents the internal security dimension of a state 
responsible for law and civil order. In conflict situations the internal and external security 
dimension (the military) can become blurred and the police can get involved in the fighting.xx 
De-militarizing the police, vetting them for war crimes, or in the case of Kosovo, establishing 
a new, untainted police force, is crucial in the process of separating the internal and external 
security dimensions. Second, the police are first contact most people have with the rule of 
law and it is their professionalism and neutrality (or lack thereof) that influences society’s 
perceptions of and trust in the state’s wider rule of law.xxi Although international police 
reform has undergone tremendous changes over the past decades, core criticisms pertaining 
to the often technical, Western style, one-size-fits-all approach to reforming local police 
forces remain.xxii While lessons-learned with regards to prevalent logistical problems such as 
the quality and quantity of available international police personnel are starting to be 
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addressed by some donors, reform continues to be hampered by local institutional, cultural, 
and political realities on the ground.xxiii  
 The same is true for the Kosovo Police (KP) which was created from scratch by the 
United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) that took over the governance, 
including executive policing, of the former Serbian province after the violent conflict 
between the Serbian army and the Kosovo Liberation Army ended in June 1999. New 
officers were trained by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s police 
school, and provided with practical experience by the UNMIK International Police Unit 
responsible for executive policing in Kosovo at the time. Despite this clean-slate start, the KP 
still faces organisational problems today. Two of these issues that are relevant for this 
analysis are: first, the rigidity of the command structure which means that lower rank 
obedience is strict and coercively enforced. This is compounded by the weakness of the 
police federation to effectively protect officers from arbitrary superior’s decisions or 
punishment.xxiv Second, political influence in the Kosovo Police is prevalent in the senior 
management, which influences the attitude of those officers to reforms that threaten their 
power base or the interests of their political sponsor.xxv This influence is enhanced by the fact 
that the KP General Director is chosen by the Prime Minister. These realities of the 
organisational culture of the KP will be shown to influence to some degree the perceptions 
towards the EU Rule of Law Mission and compliance with their reforms, both positively and 
negatively. 
 The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)xxvi was created after Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, to relieve UNMIK and continue to 
support Kosovo’s rule of law.xxvii EULEX was envisioned to support Kosovo’s ‘supervised 
independence’ but this proposal was not supported by Russia in the UN Security Council as it 
backed Serbia’s concern of losing its province. Therefore, EULEX was deployed under the 
umbrella of UN Resolution 1244, which had provided the framework for the international 
administration since 1999. However, Resolution 1244 saw the status question of Kosovo as 
unresolved, which meant that EULEX, rather than supporting Kosovo’s independent state 
institutions, including the rule of law, was forced to deploy as a status-neutral mission.xxviii 
This means that EULEX rule of law reforms and the functioning of the mission cannot be 
based on Kosovo state laws but only on UNMIK regulations, a procedural fact that is flouted 
to ensure the functionality of the mission.xxix 
Reforms for the Kosovo Police were pursued through EULEX’ cooperative monitoring, 
mentoring, and advising (MMA) approach. Only a small number of areas were subject to 
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executive investigations by the operation.xxx The MMA approach relied on interaction and 
cooperation of the local police with EULEX police staff in the implementation of the 
individual reform projects designed by EULEX that target institutional weaknesses of the 
Kosovo Police (KP). To facilitate this cooperation, EULEX police staff were co-located with 
their local counterparts that means each local officer was assigned a EULEX police officer to 
work with on these projects.xxxi The individual MMA reforms were drawn up by EULEX 
based on what their staff perceived as institutional weaknesses. This reform catalogue was 
then presented to the KP senior management for approval and comments. However, this was 
perceived to have been more an exercise of rubber-stamping rather than seeking genuine 
local input.xxxii  
Two of these reform projects are analysed for this paper: the inclusion of community 
consultation into the daily patrols of police officers, aiming at ensuring that community needs 
drive local policing priorities; and the inclusion of the ethnicity of victims of crime into the 
police reports, in order to be able to produce meaningful statistics about the prevalence of 
ethnically-motivated crimes in Kosovo. Both reforms meant a normative change for the 
Kosovo police; the first because it made community concerns the driving force in 
determining police priorities, and the latter as it sought to enshrine the importance of 
understanding and counteracting trends in ethnic crimes. 
 
Framework for Analysing Local Compliance 
 
In order to explore why local actors comply with international peacebuilding missions’ 
reform requests, this paper explores three power pathways: legitimacy, coercion, and reward-
seeking.xxxiii This section introduces the framework used to investigate how each power 
pathways is linked to compliance. The understanding of the concepts and choice of variables 
in this framework is based on the literature on compliance in International Relations and 
Political Science. However, as this paper wields several complex and elusive concepts which, 
for the purpose of this analysis, need to be operationalized, a degree of simplification is 
required to allow for a methodical analysis.  
Coercion relies on the threat or application of sanctions or punishment for non-
compliance. An actor under coercion complies because he fears negative consequences for 
non-compliant behaviour. Coercion can work both to prevent and to retrospectively punish 
non-compliance.xxxiv These choices are subject to an actor’s rational evaluation of what 
course of action is most beneficial (in the sense of least hurtful). While the stimulus for action 
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is externally imposed by the authority making the compliance demand, it is the choice of the 
actor whether he intends to follow or resist that stimulus.xxxv Coercion requires an actor to 
believe that any non-compliance will be detected and punished, making the initial threat 
credible.xxxvi Coercion hence works through a system of close surveillance, which is 
suggested as the intervening variable linking coercion to compliance in the below 
hypothesized mechanism. In the context of police reforms in Kosovo coercion includes direct 
lawful orders, pressure, or threats towards an officer from a local superior, all of which are 
known to carry seriously consequences in case of non-compliance.  Coercion by EULEX has 
an individual and an institutional element. As an institution EULEX can try and coerce the 
elite, in this case the senior management of the KP, with a bad report to Brussels, trying to 
bring the weight of the EU in terms of funding and accession into play. For individual 
officers outside the senior management, coercion by EULEX takes the form of a complaint 
by the EULEX counterpart to the local officer’s superior. Therefore, it is only effective when 
exercised through the local chain of command.  
 
 
Mechanism 1 
     Close surveillance    Compliance 
Coercion  
     No close surveillance   No Compliance 
 
Showing a reward-seeking attitude, an actor is expected to choose compliance if 
doing so maximizes his personal benefits and minimizes associated costs of compliance. 
Such incentives are not necessarily restricted to material benefits like money but can also 
include social ones such as status gain.xxxvii Like coercion, reward-seeking is also considered 
an intervention strategy for manipulating actors’ choices of action, but it can only be used 
preventatively. The stimulus for action of the actor is provided externally by the incentives 
offered to induce his compliance, but like with coercion, it is the choice of the actor whether 
they intend to give in the stimulus. The choice for compliance or non-compliance is made on 
the basis of whether incentives are available that outweigh the cost of compliance.xxxviii The 
availability of an incentive structure is the hypothesized intervening variable connecting the 
attitude of reward-seeking to compliance, as the below mechanism depicts. In the context of 
police reforms in Kosovo, examples of rewards include promotion (and with that increase in 
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salary), recognition by a superior or EULEX, a favourable opinion by a superior or EULEX, 
or gaining of experience (all as possibly leading to a future promotion). 
 
 
Mechanism 2    
Incentive structure      Compliance 
Reward-seeking    
    No incentive structure        No Compliance 
 
 
Legitimacy is a pathway of compliance described by Weber as: ‘to influence the conduct of 
one or more others (the ruled) […] in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant 
degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their 
conduct for its very own sake’.xxxix Contrary to reward-seeking and coercion, which require 
external stimuli, in the case of legitimacy ‘control by others is replaced by self-control, as 
social norms and values are internalized and become part of the individual’s own desires 
concerning how to behave’.xl Legitimacy provides a reason for compliance as through the 
process of internalisation the issued rules or laws become part of the individual’s own 
motivational system; they turn into an internal sense of obligation. This means the 
requirement to make someone comply against their will becomes redundant. He does not 
need to be constrained from deviant actions as such actions are not considered in the actor’s 
interest anymore.xli   
However, at the same time legitimacy also imposes constraints on rule-makers not to 
exceed the limits of their legitimacy. Legitimacy is hence a social and relational process 
which has consequences for both the rule-maker and the rule-recipient - the actor and the 
institution – it is both a constitutive and a constraining factor.xlii In this interactive 
relationship, an institution makes legitimacy claims which are either accepted or rejected by 
the audience to which they are addressed. These two sides of the dialogue constitute the 
elements of legitimacy: processes of legitimation and perceptions of legitimacy.xliii The 
processes of legitimation concern the ways in which an institution makes claims as to its own 
legitimacy, and the perceptions arise from the legitimacy judgements made by the audience 
towards the institution. This paper is interested in the legitimacy perceptions of local police 
officers towards the EULEX mission. 
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According to the literature, legitimacy is linked to compliance via an internal sense of 
obligation. This obligation is a norm-oriented condition which puts internal pressure on an 
actor to comply, as compliance is considered ‘intrinsically rewarding’,xliv and the right thing 
to do.xlv High legitimacy perceptions of an organisation are therefore hypothesized to foster 
an internal sense of obligation, which increases compliance, while low legitimacy perceptions 
have no such impact. In the context of police reform in Kosovo legitimacy includes 
statements about the rightfulness and appropriateness of the way the operation exercises its 
power (procedural legitimacy) and its performance and results (output legitimacy).  
 
 
Mechanism 3 
      High  Internal moral obligation   Compliance 
Legitimacy perception           
   Low   No Internal moral obligation     No Compliance 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to test the compliance mechanisms empirically, this paper analyses two examples of 
police reform stipulated by EULEX. These two reforms are ‘Annual Patrol Plans’ 
(Community Policing) and ‘Victim Ethnicity-Crime Statistics’. These case studies were 
selected from 36 police reforms defined by EULEX in 2009.xlvi The selection was based on 
several criteria: the need for the reform to be linked directly to EULEX rather than another 
donor, so compliance can be established directly; the reforms must contain an element of 
normative organisational change, which means the reform would not just have happened by 
itself. This is important to exclude automatic compliance with reforms because they are in the 
interest of the actor; and the local officers involved must have had direct working contact 
with EULEX to form their perceptions. 
The ‘local actors’ interviewed for this paper are the officers of the Kosovo Police who 
worked directly on these two reforms. The sample drawn is purposive as discrimination was 
needed to interview those officers closest to the processes under analysis. However, as far as 
possible, attention was paid to include a diverse sample, including officers of all ranks from 
Officer to Colonel as well as from Albanian, Serb, Bosniak, and Turkish ethnic belonging. 
Further, officers from five of the six regions of Kosovo were interviewed and from a 
selection of rural and urban police stations, including stations in Serb majority areas.xlvii The 
11 
 
interviews were conducted in English, or, if required, in Serbian and Albanian with the help 
of a local interpreter.  
 The data for evaluating local compliance comes from official EULEX reports, quality 
control reports, meeting minutes, and documents required as outputs from the reforms. 
Triangulation was used to corroborate information needed for the evaluation of local actors’ 
compliance in accordance with the indicators in the below table. All documents are on copy 
with the author and were gained from both EULEX officials and Kosovo Police officials 
during the field work. The annual EULEX reports are available on their website but the 
reform reports, minutes, and quality control reports have not been published as the mission is 
still ongoing.xlviii  
Local compliance is evaluated as based on three indicators for which data was gained 
from the reports: compliance with substantive elements of reform, compliance with the 
modus operandi of the mission (communication, cooperation), and compliance with the spirit 
of reform (local drive, ownership, purpose). To evaluate instances of compliance, each 
indicator is scored between 1 and 3, and the overall score for all three indicators serves to 
categorize compliance. Compliance is captured as an ordinal variable of three degrees: low 
compliance, moderate compliance, and high compliance.  
 
Table 1 Categories of Local Compliance 
 
 
 
Low Compliance 
(score of 3,4) 
 Little or no progress and work on the required outputs and towards the 
objective of the reform (indicator I). 
 Little or no cooperation and communication with mission counterparts 
(indicator II). 
  Undermining reform process, ignoring orders, unwillingness, lack of drive 
(indicator III). 
Moderate 
Compliance 
(score of 5,6,7) 
 Some progress on reform outputs and some work towards overall objective, 
but more in form than spirit of reform (indicator I). 
 Some cooperation and communication with mission counterparts (indicator 
II). 
 Some participation with mission reforms, some willingness and drive 
(indicator III). 
High Compliance 
(score of 8,9) 
 Good active progress in achieving the outputs and the overall objective of 
the reform (indicator I). 
 Good and regular communication and cooperation with mission counterparts 
(indicator II). 
 Initiative and leadership shown for reaching the reform objectives (indicator 
III). 
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Data for the evaluation of coercion, reward-seeking, and legitimacy perceptions comes from 
face-to-face interviews with local police officers directly involved in the reforms of the two 
case studies. 35 officers of different ranks of the Kosovo Police were interviewed by the 
author in May 2012 and April 2013. The interviews included open-ended questions aimed at 
understanding the relevance of each power pathway for compliance (and also provided room 
for mentioning additional reasons for compliance if relevant), as well as survey questions on 
legitimacy perceptions. All survey items and open-ended questions are based on tried and 
tested items from academic studies and international surveys.xlix Five items asked for 
perceptions on EULEX’s output legitimacy and four items concerned EULEX’s procedural 
legitimacy. Each statement could be answered with an agreement scale of five categories 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.l Legitimacy is also measured as an ordinal 
variable of three categories of low, moderate, and high legitimacy. Individual actors’ 
legitimacy perceptions are categorized according to the indicators defined in the below table.  
 
Table 2 Categories of Local Legitimacy 
 
 
 
Local Compliance with EULEX Police Reform 
 
Two examples of EULEX’ cooperative police reforms serve as empirical testing ground for 
the compliance framework. This section introduces the compliance of the relevant local 
police officers involved in the reforms on community policing and victim-ethnicity crime-
statistics. EULEX distinguished three groups of actors for the reforms: the Action Team, 
Low Legitimacy  Survey answers disagreeing with more than 3 items and being undecided on 
more than 3. 
 Statements and responses to open-ended question indicative of little to no 
belief of mission adhering to right process and/or working towards locally 
desired goals. 
Moderate 
Legitimacy 
 Survey answers disagreeing with 2 or less items, and/or, being undecided 
about up to 3 items. 
 Statements and responses to open-ended question indicative of some belief of 
mission adhering to right process and/or working towards locally desired 
goals. 
High Legitimacy  Survey answers which agree with majority of statements, disagrees with less 
than, and is undecided on less than 2 items. 
 Statements and responses to open-ended question indicative of belief of 
mission adhering to right process and/or working towards locally desired 
goals. 
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made up of lower ranking officers, were responsible for the technical implementation of the 
reform; Team Leaders, Deputies and Coordinators were middle-management rank officers 
who oversaw and supported the Action Team; the senior management of the Kosovo Police 
was in charge of the entire reform process and received reports from the middle-management. 
EULEX’s structure of the groups of actors involved is mirrored in their reports and therefore 
kept for the purpose of this analysis.li  
In the former Yugoslavia the policing philosophy was state-oriented in that the police was 
considered an instrument of state control.lii In Kosovo this situation had been exacerbated by 
the systematic oppression of the Albanian community by the Serbian leadership. The Serb-
dominated police controlled the Kosovo-Albanian population and supported their oppression 
under the newly enforced laws of Milosevic. The Kosovo-Albanian population hence 
developed their own rule of law system and a moral code that ‘if you contacted the police, the 
community would think you were a traitor’.liii This legacy of thinking of the police as part of 
a hostile system posed challenges to the creation of a new police in Kosovo, which was to 
enjoy the trust of the entire population. The new philosophy of the Kosovo Police (KP) was 
to embrace community-oriented policing, which envisions the relations between the police 
and the public as a partnership, with community needs determining policing priorities.liv This 
gives community police officers a greater degree of autonomy to determine their work 
schedule than their response colleagues. One of the challenges for community policing is for 
patrols to be effective and purpose driven despite this higher level of autonomy.lv This is 
particularly true in a country such as Kosovo, which is still in the process of changing their 
structures and police culture towards community policing. Although the concept was 
introduced with the start of the new police school in 1999 through the OSCE, it was not until 
2005 that a more detailed course in community policing was developed.lvi While imbuing the 
new police cadets with this philosophy is said to have worked well in general, the application 
of the philosophy in daily policing is more of a challenge, especially the question of directing 
patrols to be effective and purpose driven in consulting the community and developing 
policing priorities from their needs. 
The application of community consultation in the daily patrol was one of the 
weaknesses spotted by EULEX in their baseline study: ‘In short, a structured approach 
to tackling patrol effectively should involve converting local community concerns into 
a list of (written) policing priorities’.lvii EULEX therefore promoted community 
policing in daily policing patrols as a normative change to the way patrols where being 
done by the KP. The objective of the reform ‘Annual Patrol Plans (Community 
14 
 
Policing)’ was the incorporation of community policing into police patrols plans as 
based on active community consultation.lviii This objective was to be achieved by 
meeting three outputs: 
1. Draft of effective patrol plans for all police stations in Kosovo and all regional stations. 
2. Implementation of the patrol plan [including training]. 
3. Evaluation of the patrol plan.lix 
 
 Work on the action had started in September 2009, and by 2010 the team had finished the 
templates for an annual and daily patrol plan, as required by Output One.lx These templates 
were tested in a pilot project in the two regions of Peja/Pec and Gjilan/e, which was declared 
a success. Subsequently, the templates were sent to Pristina Police HQ to be approved by the 
General Director of the KP.lxi The produced templates were then introduced to most police 
stations by the KP senior command, fulfilling Output Two. However, the required training 
was not provided to the station and regional commanders. Also, the evaluation of the 
application of the reform at station level, as foreseen by Output Three, was never conducted 
by the KP senior management. In 2011, EULEX decided to conduct the required evaluation 
itself, without any input from the KP.lxii 
Compliance had been high by the team and middle management responsible for 
implementation. The required templates were of good quality (score 3 for indicator I),lxiii and 
cooperation and communication with EULEX were good and productive (score 3 for 
indicator II). Finally, the team’s work had been focused and driven; the team leader and team 
showed interest and purpose in their work, and the pilot projects were conducted very 
thoroughly (score 3 for Indicator III).lxiv 
The senior management of the KP failed to organize training for the station and 
regional commanders before disseminating the templates, and it did not conduct an 
evaluation of the application of the reforms at station level (score 2 for indicator I). Their 
cooperation with EULEX was at best uncoordinated as EULEX was not involved in the 
dissemination of the templates (score 1 for indicator II).lxv Finally, the senior management 
showed only moderate interest in driving the reform forwards or its actual aim as was 
reflected in the cut off way the reform was implemented (score 2 for indicator III). What 
explains some of this apparent disinterest in the reform is the fact the senior management at 
that point in time was being exchanged. Some of the requirements were therefore lost in 
translation, which means while compliance was low by the incoming senior management, this 
was not intentional. 
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Table 3 Compliance Levels of Reform: Annual Patrol Plans (Community Policing) 
Actors Compliance with 
Implementation 
Compliance with Continued 
Adherence 
Team High (8) Na 
Middle Management High (8) Na  
Senior Management Moderate (5) Moderate 
 
The second example of police reform analysed here is concerned with recording the ethnicity 
of victims of crime. Particularly in post-conflict societies, it is important that trends in crimes 
targeting minority communities can be detected.lxvi This is crucial for the viability of a multi-
ethnic state and the effective protection of minority communities. The latter was an important 
normative reform standard for EULEX. Reliable crime statistics were considered the first 
step towards counter-acting inter-ethnic crimes, understood as acts committed due to the 
victim’s belonging to a certain ethnic group. In 2009, EULEX found that information for 
establishing whether a crime had had an inter-ethnic background was not available to the 
Kosovo Police.lxvii  
For reform ‘Victim-Ethnicity Crime-Statistics’, the overall objective was, ‘the design and 
implementation of an effective policy of recording, collecting and collating the ethnicity of 
victims of crime and instances of crime that are likely to be ethnically motivated’.lxviii This 
was to be achieved by accomplishing four outputs:  
1. A detailed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and related strategy.  
2. A training programme to fully implement the SOP. 
3. A training programme for all relevant KP staff involved in the collection, collation, 
retrieval and analysis of police incident data. 
4. 80% compliance with SOP within 18 months.lxix 
 
The action team commenced their work in December 2009 and declared it completed in 
March 2011. The team drafted a standard operating procedure (SOP), which stipulated how 
to collect data and enter it into the police’s internal IT system correctly.lxx As a new IT 
system was meant to be introduced soon anyway, Output Two, training on the old IT system, 
was declared redundant. For Output Three, a training session on the content of the new SOP 
was designed and delivered by the team leader. For Output Four, monitoring was conducted 
by the team leader and his deputy through field visits to stations between September and 
February 2010/11.lxxi  
 Superficially, compliance seemed high as the team accomplished the three relevant 
outputs in good time. However, the objective called for a ‘policy’ for the KP to be able to 
collect and analyse information on the ethnicity of victims, and of ‘instances of crime that are 
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likely to be ethnically motivated’.lxxii No policy was compiled by the team and the SOP did 
not change the way data was collected and analysed, to enable crime statistics to show 
ethnically-motivated crimes (score 1 for indicator I). Overall, the team’s outputs led to very 
little in terms of real outcomes, despite good leadership and hard work by the team leader.lxxiii 
The team leader’s and deputy’s compliance was high in terms of their cooperation with 
EULEX (score of 3 for indicator II), and in providing leadership and drive for the project 
(score 2 for indicator III), but they failed to correct the flaws in the project. The reason for 
this oversight was most likely the lack of training and experience of these middle ranking 
officers in project design, not a typical policing task at that level. The senior management’s 
only task in this project was to approve the SOP, which they did.  
 
Table 4 Compliance Levels for Reform: Victim-Ethnicity Crime-Statistics 
Actors Compliance with 
Implementation 
Compliance with Continued 
Adherence 
Team Moderate (5) Na  
Middle-Management Moderate (6) Na  
Senior Management High (8) Na 
 
Power Pathways of Compliance and Non-Compliance 
 
Coercion 
The low-ranked members of the action teams for community policing and victim-ethnicity 
had been appointed by their respective superiors without consultation. In the interviews and 
surveys conducted by the author with these actors, all team members stressed that they had 
received an order to work on the respective reforms, and that was their main reason to 
participate. Asked why they complied with that order, replies centred on the fear of sanctions. 
It was made very clear that contravening an order was not a beneficial option and that 
coercion played a predominant role in ensuring these actors’ compliance.lxxiv Coercion was 
felt with regards to the local chain of command; their orders and potential sanctions for non-
compliance made coercion an important pathways leading to compliance with EULEX’s 
reforms. None of the team members mentioned fear of sanctions from EULEX as a 
compliance reason, on the contrary, the EULEX staff was said to have been very collegial 
and helpful, rather than threatening or pressuring.lxxv  
The middle ranks of team leaders, deputies and coordinators were also appointed to 
the respective reforms, but this order was received more positively, as it was seen to provide 
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the chance to gain more responsibility. However, when asked what would happen in case 
they refused to accept the extra work, they all explained that would be ‘a bad idea’.lxxvi 
Although not to the same extent as for the team members, fear of sanction was relevant as a 
pathway for compliance for these middle ranks as well. EULEX was also not mentioned as 
putting pressure on them or threatening sanctions for non-compliance, but rather as being 
supportive. Coercion was reported as coming only from the local police’s chain of command. 
Coercion was hardly a significant pathway for the senior management of the KP, as 
the General Director and his deputies had no superiors from whom to fear sanctions or 
pressure. The Ministry of Interior, to which the General Director is usually answerable, was 
excluded from the MMA reforms due to concerns about political influence.lxxvii EULEX had 
the possibility to put pressure on the senior command through a negative report to Brussels or 
complaints to the Kosovo political elite. In practice, however, this option was hardly ever 
taken, as EULEX staff feared it would show them up as being inefficient, a common dilemma 
in peacebuilding.lxxviii As this reluctance was known to the KP senior management, it 
undermined the credibility of the threat when used.lxxix Further, there was the overall threat 
inherent in EU peacebuilding that non-compliance entails not being admitted into the EU or 
being cut funding. The first is a very distant perspective for Kosovo and was not mentioned 
as a motivational factor (either in the positive or the negative) by any respondent. For the 
second, funding for projects is channelled through the European Commission Liaison Office 
in Kosovo not EULEX. Further, both reasons are quite general and do not touch upon the 
daily realities of policing in Kosovo. However, if they had had an impact at all, it would have 
been expected to be at the level of the senior management, due to their close ties with the 
political elites of the country. 
As a coercive order relies on constant monitoring to detect misbehaviour, 
‘surveillance’ is analysed here as the intervening variable connecting coercion to 
compliance.lxxx  For the team members, direct surveillance was present through the monthly 
meetings and the near constant contact via phone and email with other team members and 
team leaders.lxxxi Additionally, the team members reported in writing to the action team 
leaders and their regular superior. They were also under scrutiny from their EULEX 
counterparts who were present at meetings and in daily contact via phone or email to keep up 
to date. 
Surveillance for the team leaders and deputies was present through the monthly 
meetings with the coordinators, to whom they reported on their teams’ progress.lxxxii 
Additionally, they reported in writing to the coordinators and their regular superiors every 
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month. The team leaders and deputies were monitored not constantly but regularly, although 
the monitoring was less closely than for the team members. For the coordinators, monitoring 
was also regular through a monthly meeting, but as they reported directly to the senior 
management, which was removed from details of implementation, they had more discretion 
in their work. EULEX monitored all middle-management officers quite closely as well, 
potentially closer than the chain of command, by being present and involved with the work. 
Surveillance for the senior command of the KP is also usually exercised by the 
Ministry of Interior, but the design of the MMA reforms effectively precluded such 
surveillance. EULEX did monitor their senior counterparts, but as they were loath to employ 
their tools for sanctions, this surveillance did not enforce the likelihood of sanctions and was 
largely symbolic.  
For the team members the close degree of surveillance, which demonstrated to the 
team members the likelihood that non-compliance would be detected, made coercion a highly 
relevant compliance mechanism. It was ensured through the fear of sanctions from the local 
chain of command but not from EULEX. Coercion guaranteed a basic level of compliance 
but it did not, as stressed by most team members, make for enthusiastic compliance. Due to 
the decreasing degree of surveillance from the chain of command, coercion was less relevant 
but still played a role in ensuring basic compliance for the middle-management ranks. 
Although EULEX did monitor them, it was not mentioned as being perceived as threatening 
by these officers; EULEX was not seen as having the same coercive potential to affect 
compliance that the KP chain of command had. Coercion was, due to the lack of fear of 
sanction from EULEX and non-involvement of the political elites, not relevant for ensuring 
compliance of the senior management of the Kosovo Police.  
 
Reward-seeking 
Most team members stressed that they had had low expectations for being rewarded for the 
reform work. One respondent explained, ‘It was only extra work, no reward, not even a thank 
you’.lxxxiii Such statements indicate that the team members had conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis, which brought them to this conclusion. Despite the negative evaluation, the reward-
seeking attitude was present, both with regard to EULEX and the local chain of command. 
 Reward-seeking as an attitude was more overt in the middle management officers than 
in the lower ranks of the team. These officers’ replies to the question of why they had 
complied were because of ‘professional development’. They saw the new responsibility as a 
chance to prove their worth to their superiors, and clearly stated that career benefit had been a 
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reason for their compliance.lxxxiv Incentives were perceived to come to a limited degree from 
EULEX but mainly from the local chain of command.  
The attitude of reward-seeking was also present for the senior management. The 
deputies desired promotion to General Director and the increased salary, whereas for the 
General Director, that was not much of an option anymore. ‘Where am I supposed to go from 
here?’ he commented when asked about promotion prospects.lxxxv However, also his attitude 
did show a cost/benefit analysis had been made.  
The existence of an incentive structure is the hypothesized intervening variable 
linking reward-seeking to compliance.lxxxvi In practice very few incentives were available to 
the team members. As police officers work on a fixed salary, monetary rewards were 
unavailable independent of promotion. Given the little involvement of their regular superiors, 
gaining a positive evaluation from them was also unlikely. Some alluded to the gaining of 
knowledge and experience as positive benefits, which might also be considered a step 
towards promotion. In general though, the incentive structure was very limited and also 
EULEX realistically did not have any rewards to offer at this level, apart from a pat on the 
back.  
The team leaders, deputies, and the coordinators had more incentives to gain than the 
teams. Through their work on reforms, they regularly interacted with senior ranks. Good 
work was likely to be recognized and rewarded through the chain of command of the KP. At 
this level EULEX could offer rewards in the sense of a positive mention to the senior 
command, however, this was considered the more indirect route, as proper benefits, like a 
promotion, could only come from the Kosovo Police itself. 
EULEX was not considered to offer incentives to the senior management. Rewards 
could realistically only come from high political levels (as the General Director is appointed 
by the Prime Minister), and those were not considered to be triggered by good work on the 
MMA reforms but more through political loyalty (which can in fact contravene the 
peacebuilding work). EULEX had little to offer to the senior management other than a 
positive mention to the political elite. This was not sought after as many senior officers had 
better contacts to the highest political levels than EULEX did.lxxxvii  
For the team members, reward-seeking, though present as an attitude, was irrelevant 
for their compliance levels due to the limited availability of incentives. It did, however, also 
not have a negative effect on compliance, despite the costs outweighing the benefits, due to 
the strength of coercion in ensuring compliance. The interviews made clear that for the 
middle-management ranks reward-seeking had been of strong relevance for compliance, and 
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the availability of an incentive structure meant that this translated into a behavioural effect in 
supporting compliance. This is mirrored by the high level of compliance by these ranks, 
shown in the reform on community policing, and also, though with less lasting impact, in the 
reform on victim-ethnicity. While reward-seeking was clearly relevant as a pathway to 
compliance for the senior management, the limited incentives available from EULEX meant 
that reward-seeking did not influence compliance for the senior Kosovo Police management, 
as efforts were not matched by rewards.  
 
Legitimacy 
For some of the action teams’ members, legitimacy considerations of EULEX were an 
additional, though secondary, compliance reason. All respondents primarily stressed that they 
had been ordered and complied due to fear of negative sanctions. However, the team working 
on community policing explained that they had also considered the reforms right and 
appropriate for the rule of law in Kosovo. Only one of the team members working on victim-
ethnicity mentioned such additional compliance reasons.lxxxviii The scores of the legitimacy 
survey support the difference in perceptions between the two teams, as tables 5 and 6 show.  
For the team members working on community policing, legitimacy perceptions were high, 
but for those working on victim-ethnicity they were moderate.lxxxix  
In addition to their expectation of rewards, the team leaders, deputies, and 
coordinators highlighted that they considered the reforms right and appropriate for the KP 
and Kosovo. One respondent stated, ‘EULEX was good. They provided expertise; we got 
what we needed from them’. The cooperation with EULEX was described as ‘a pragmatic 
approach based on trust’.xc In the surveys, these officers showed high legitimacy perceptions, 
as shown in tables 5 and 6 below. 
The KP senior management held high legitimacy perceptions of EULEX. One 
explained he supported EULEX for their ‘high degree of professionalism’.xci Another deputy 
General Director explained, ‘They helped us a lot, we know this and we recognize this. 
EULEX treats their local partners respectfully, and are responsive to our needs’.xcii The 
survey results confirmed their high levels of legitimacy. 
The intervening variable hypothesized to connect legitimacy to compliance is an 
internal moral obligation. The clearest indicator of the existence of a moral obligation was 
that officers stressed internal motivations for working on the reforms that were linked to the 
legitimacy of the mission. The team members working on community policing showed a 
clearly established sense of moral obligation. They explained that working on the EULEX 
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reforms was ‘right and important’ because they considered the mission and its reforms 
legitimate. However, for most of the team members working on victim-ethnicity who held 
moderate legitimacy perceptions no internal moral obligation was discernible. They only 
stated that they worked on the reforms because they feared non-compliance would mean 
punishment from the chain of command.xciii 
The middle management officers who held high legitimacy perceptions showed strong 
internal motivations for compliance. Their internal moral obligation was expressed in the 
internal need to be satisfied with their own work due to the reform’s appropriateness, and 
considering the judgement ‘that is at the bottom of my head’ to be the most crucial.xciv Also 
for the senior management, the General Director explained, he worked hard on the reforms as 
they were right and good for improving the KP. In terms of motivation he explained that he 
only had ‘himself for a judge’, showing internal rather than external reasoning.xcv 
In terms of an impact of legitimacy on compliance, for the team members working on 
community policing, their high legitimacy perceptions are suggested to have increased the 
quality of their compliance. Although that cannot be measured and therefore remains a 
suggestion, it was confirmed by their team leaders and their EULEX counterparts.xcvi The 
good quality of the work of the team members for community policing is an indicator for 
their internal conviction of the rightfulness of the reforms; a quality mark that coercion does 
not engender in compliance. For the team members working on victim-ethnicity, no internal 
obligation could be established which means that mainly coercion ensured their compliance. 
This could explain why these officers worked to the word rather than the spirit of the reform 
which showed the superficial way the outputs were fulfilled in the reform on victim-ethnicity. 
For the middle-management officers, high legitimacy perceptions engendered a strong 
internal moral obligation. This corresponds to the high level of compliance of the middle 
management officers working on community policing, as highlighted in the compliance 
section. Also the middle-management officers working on victim-ethnicity showed high 
legitimacy perceptions and a clear internal moral obligation which influenced the drive and 
willingness highlighted above. 
The senior management stated clearly that they felt internally obliged to work hard on 
the reforms because they considered EULEX a highly legitimate organisation. This General 
Director was noted internationally for his drive and leadership in the MMA reform work 
(except for on the reform discussed before, which fell through the net in the transition 
process).xcvii As the senior management were not afraid of sanctions for non-compliance, or 
induced into compliance by EULEX, legitimacy presented the only effective way to ensure 
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their compliance. EULEX’ coercive potential would present another option, had they been 
willing and capable to muster it. This relevance of legitimacy for compliance showed in the 
later years of the MMA process, when the new General Director was deeply mistrustful of 
EULEX, and consequently the MMA work effectively came to a standstill.xcviii  
 
Table 5 Compliance and Motivations: Annual Patrol Plans (Community Policing) 
Actors Compliance 
Legitimacy 
 Perceptions 
Relevance 
Coercion 
Reward-
Seeking Legitimacy 
Action Team High High 
Highly 
relevant Not relevant  Relevant 
Middle 
Management High High Relevant 
Highly 
relevant 
Highly 
relevant 
Senior 
Management 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
Not relevant 
 
Not relevant 
 
 
 
Highly 
relevant 
      
 
Table 6 Compliance and Motivations: Victim-Ethnicity Crime-Statistics 
Actors Compliance 
Legitimacy 
 Perceptions 
Relevance 
Coercion 
Reward-
Seeking Legitimacy 
Action Team Moderate Moderate 
Highly 
relevant Not relevant  Relevant 
Middle 
Management Moderate High Relevant 
Highly 
relevant 
Highly 
relevant 
Senior 
Management 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
Not relevant 
 
Not relevant 
 
 
 
Highly 
relevant 
      
Source: Author’s legitimacy survey, Kosovo, 2013. See appendix for data. 
 
Discussion 
 
More research is required to understand whether the findings of this study are limited to 
Kosovo and these two case studies or whether they indicate patterns behind local compliance 
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choices.xcix In their limited scope, these findings shine new light on the relevance of each 
power pathway for compliance, the significance of legitimacy, the importance of local chain 
of command coercion, and the mechanisms linking each power pathway to compliance. 
First, the empirical analysis finds that legitimacy, coercion, and reward-seeking do not 
influence compliance directly, but through the respective intervening variables specified in 
the compliance framework. Specifically, they show that the power pathway is only relevant 
for compliance in those situations where the respective intervening variable is present. So for 
instance, the attitude of reward-seeking was present for all officers interviewed (though to 
varying degrees) but only if these officers had access to a viable incentive structure 
(promotion, recognition, etc.) did this attitude actually have an effect on their compliance. 
This finding expands understanding of the tripartite power pathways employed by the 
literature on compliance as it suggests an explanatory mechanism showing how the three 
pathways are linked to compliance, rather than assuming this link.  
Second, the findings show that while all three pathways influence to local compliance, 
they do so to varying degrees and in specific contexts depending on the rank and position of 
an officer. Coercion was of most relevance to the lower ranked officers because they are 
under very close surveillance. In the organisational culture of the KP, coercion is always 
significant for lower ranked officers, irrespective of EULEX’ police reforms, due to the 
rigidity of the chain of command structure. For the purpose of EULEX’ reforms, this 
effectiveness of local coercion supported the implementation of the reforms, as long as the 
senior management supported them. For the middle-management ranks, the significance of 
coercion declines, as these ranks are granted a little more discretion in the fulfilment of their 
duties. On the individual level, the lower and middle-management ranks did not perceive 
their EULEX counterparts as coercive on an individual level. This is explained by EULEX 
staff’s awareness of their limited coercive powers and their ensuing reluctance to make 
complaints to their counterparts’ superior which would sour their professional relationships.c 
EULEX’ institutional coercive power vis-à-vis the senior management was limited by the 
operation’s reluctance to report bad compliance back to Brussels. Threats were therefore seen 
as symbolic or empty by the senior management, if EULEX did try to coerce them.  
Reward-seeking, on the other hand, increases the higher ranked the officers are, as 
incentive structures become available to these officers that lower ranked officers do not have 
access to. While (or possibly because) coercion is so relevant in determining local actors’ 
compliance for the lower police ranks, legitimacy only plays a secondary role. It is suggested 
though to increase the quality of compliance for officers. Legitimacy does become highly 
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relevant for the middle-management and senior management of the Kosovo Police. In their 
limited way, these findings speak to the International Relations debates mirrored in the 
peacebuilding literature, about whether legitimacy or rational choice approaches matter 
(more) for compliance.  
The findings, while bounded, speak to the literature on peacebuilding concerned with 
compliance and the power of international peacebuilding efforts to ensure reforms are 
implemented successfully. In line with the increasing recognition that local compliance and 
‘buy in’ to the reform process are important in shaping international peacebuilding 
outcomes,ci the analysis shows that all three pathways are important for local compliance but 
that their relevance depends on two factors: the intervening variable of the mechanisms being 
in place, and the rank and position of the officer. This is also true for the mechanisms of 
legitimacy, heralded as crucial to local compliance, support, and acceptance of international 
peacebuilding.cii While these findings do support the important role legitimacy plays in 
supporting compliance, they also qualify it at the same time because the findings demonstrate 
that much of local compliance was explained through the pathways of coercion and reward-
seeking. The findings therefore contribute nuance to the usually binary debate about whether 
legitimacy or rational-choice mechanisms matter in peacebuilding. They show that broad 
statements about legitimacy’s importance are only useful to make them heard above the 
clamour of rational-choice theory, but are ultimately unhelpful in understanding its relevance 
and impact on local actors’ compliance choices.  
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